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STROHACKER REVISITED -
A PROBLEM IN MINERAL CONVEYANCES
Sam Sexton, Jr .
In 1892 and 1893, S t . Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern 
Railway Company, a predecessor of M issouri P acific  Railroad 
Company, conveyed certain  lands in M iller County, Arkansas, 
by deed containing the following reservation:
"Reserving a ll coal and mineral deposits in and upon 
said lands with the right to  said grantor, its  su c-  
c e sso rs  and assig n s at any and a ll times to enter upon 
said lands and to mine and remove any and a ll coal and 
mineral deposits found thereon without any claim for 
damages on behalf of said  grantee, his heirs or a s s ig n s ."
In 1941, Strohacker, a remote grantee of the railroad, 
brought an actio n  in the Chancery Court of M iller County to 
can cel the reservation  and to quiet title  to the oil and g as. The 
lower court granted the re lie f sought, as to the o il and g as, and th is  
was affirmed on appeal. M issouri P acific  Railroad v. Strohacker,
202 Ark. 645 , 152 SW 2d 5 8 7 . The opinion of our Supreme Court in 
that ca se  and the subsequent treatm ent of the opinion form the basis  
for th is d isc u ss io n .
My im p u lse  is  to say that the Court in that opinion stated 
eight reasons for the result reach ed . In deference to the later 
opinions of the court, however, I think I should say that the Court 
mentioned eight factors and then reached its  conclu sion .
These factors may be summarized as:
(1) The railroad did not, as a matter of fa c t , own the 
m inerals at the time of execution of the deed and could 
not reserve what they did not own.
(2) The railroad, at the time of execution of the deeds did 
not intend to reserve the minerals but inserted the 
words of reservation as a safeguard against future 
claim s of breach of w arranty.
(3) O il and gas were not recognized as minerals in M iller 
County, Arkansas, at the time of execution of the 
deed, and the railroad could not have intended to 
reserve that of which it had no knowledge.
(4) O il and gas were not recognized as m inerals at any p lace  
where the railroad had o p eratio n s, the railroad could not 
have known about o il and gas and could not have p o sse sse d  
an in tention  to reserv e  o il and g a s .
(5) "L egal and Com m ercial u sage" did not recognize that the 
word "m in erals" included o il and g a s , a t the time and 
p lace  of the co n v ey an ce , and the word "m in erals" should 
be given the meaning accorded it by su ch  " le g a l and com -  
m ercial u s a g e " .
(6) As a matter of law , petroleum was not included within a 
reservation  of "m in era ls" made in 1887.
(7) The phrase "c o a l and m ineral d ep o sits"  had a leg a l 
meaning of "c o a l and dep osits of su b sta n ces  commonly 
recognized  as m inerals" and o il and gas were not common-  
ly recognized  as m in e ra ls .
(8) The grantee did not understand that the word "m ineral" 
em braced o il and gas and the co n stru ctio n  to  be p laced  
upon the word should be that "understood by the p a rtie s"  .
After d iscu ssin g  each  of the factors above s e t  forth and c itin g  
a u th o r it ie s  re levant to  e a ch , the court concluded:
"Our task  is  to  decide what Iron M ountain meant when it
reserved  'a ll  co a l and m ineral d e p o s its '."
The in tention  of the grantor, sa id  the co u rt, was to  reserv e  
o n ly  c o a l and m inerals commonly recognized  as su ch , hence the 
r e s e r v a t io n  was not su ffic ien t to  a ffe c t o il and g a s .
F ive y e a rs  la te r , upon a fa c t situ ation  id e n tica l to  that in 
S t r o h a c k e r , the court refused an exp ress  req u est to  overrule its  prior 
d e c i s io n .  M issou ri P a c ific  Railroad Company v . Furqueron, 210 Ark. 
4 6 0 , 196 SW 2d 588 (1946) .  The la tte r  d ecis io n  w as rested  squ arely  
u p o n  Stroh acker but, explain ing Stroh ack er, the d e cis io n  in the prior 
c a s e  w as stated  to be bottomed upon evid ence th at the railroad com -  
p a n y , and its  g ra n te e s , intended the reserv atio n  to  apply only to  
s u b s ta n c e s  commonly recognized  as m inerals and o il and gas w ere 
n o t in clu d ed  w ithin such la n g u a g e .
In 1948, the id en tica l reserv atio n  was ag a in  the su b je c t of an 
o p in io n  by the Supreme Court C arson  v . M issou ri P a c ific  Railroad 
Comm p an y, Thompson T ru stee , 212 Ark. 9 6 3 , 209 SW 2d 2 9 7 . In th e 
C a r s o n  c a s e , the su b stan ces w hich formed the su b je c t matter o f the
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lit ig a tio n  w as bauxite located  in  Sa lin e  County and the reservation  
was co n ta in e d  in  a deed execu ted  August 21, 1892 . The Court re -  
itera ted  i t s  re lia n ce  upon Strohacker and Furqueron, but added add i-  
tional fa c to r s  which appear to  be more p ersu asive than the p recedents:
(1) B au xite , said  the co u rt, is  rea lly  not a mineral at a l l ,  
but is  a c la y  form ation which con ta in s alumina in very 
sm all p a r t ic le s .
(2) Bauxite is  mined by the open pit m ethod. To give the 
reservation  its  lite ra l in terp retation , th e grantor, in 
order to recover the b a u x ite , could com pletely  d estroy , 
w ithout lia b ility , th e e s ta te  conveyed to  the grantee.
In th is  situ atio n , the reservation  would be as broad as  
th e grant and under th e ordinary ru les a reservation  as  
broad as the grant is  void .
T h e  follow ing year the id e n tica l reserv atio n  was again before 
the c o u r t  but under a somewhat d ifferent fa c t s itu a tio n . B rizzolara 
v. P o w e ll, 214 Ark 870 , 218 SW 2d 728 (1949). In the Brizzolara c a s e  
the re s e r v a tio n  was contained in  a deed execu ted  in 1897 on lands 
lo ca te d  in  Johnson County, A rk an sas. The m ineral rights were 
se p a ra te ly  a s s e s s e d  for ta x e s  commencing with th e year 1907 and 
were fo r fe ite d  for nonpayment of ta x e s  for the y ear 1911. Briz zo lara  
p u rchased  th e mineral ta x  t i t le  in  1921. In 1948 Pow ell brought an 
action  to  q u ie t t i t le  to the o il and gas on the theory that under th e 
S tro h ack er ru le tit le  to  the o il and gas was not included in the 
m ineral a s s e s s m e n t . The re lie f  applied for w as granted by the low er 
court, bu t th e  decree was reversed  and the c a s e  remanded on ap p eal 
for th e  re a s o n  th a t, said  the co u rt, the Stroh acker d ecis io n  and th o se  
fo llow ing i t  d ea lt with q u estion s of fa ct and not o f law and both of 
the p a r t ie s  had erroneously construed the S tro h a ck er, Furqueron and 
C arson c a s e s  a s  e stab lish in g  precedents as to  th e constru ction  o f 
the la n g u a g e  used in the re serv a tio n . The q u estio n , said  the co u rt, 
in v o lv es th e  intent with w hich the words were u se d . Intent is  a lw ays 
a q u e s tio n  o f fa c t and the c a s e  w as remanded in  order th at ev id en ce  
might b e  p resen ted  to determ ine the in tent with w hich the words w ere 
u sed .
In  1 9 5 8 , the court was p resen ted  with a deed execu ted  in 1900 , 
involv in g  lan d s in Union C ounty, A rkansas, w hich deed contained  the 
fo llow ing p h ase : "e x ce p t the m ineral in tere st in  sa id  land s". S te g a ll 
v. B u q h , 228  Ark 6 3 2 , 310 SW 2d 251. There w as testim ony in th e 
record to  support the contention  that the grantor understood o il and 
gas to  b e  m inerals and meant to  reserv e  a ll rig h ts to  the o il and gas 
when h e  ex e cu ted  the deed in  q u estio n . The low er court construed 
the p h ra se  to  exclude o il and g a s . The finding w as affirm ed on
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-appeal. After d iscu ss in g  the prior d ecis io n s in  Strohacker, Fur-  
que ron, C arso n  and B riz z o la ra , the court sta ted :
"W e think that the meaning which th is  court has 
heretofore and should hereafter give to  the word 
"m in era l" in con n ection  with its  u se  in situations 
sim ilar to  th o se  in th is  c a s e , is  governed not by 
what the grantor meant or might have m ean t, but 
by the general le g a l or com m ercial u sage of the 
word at the tim e and p lace of its  u s a g e . The t e s -  
tim ony of the c a s e  under con sid eration  ju stifie d  
th e  tr ia l cou rt, we th in k , in finding that the word 
"m in era l" in its  a cce p te d  leg al and com m ercial 
u sa g e  did not in clu d e o il and gas in  Union County 
in  1 9 0 0 ."
Thus, it  can  be se en  that in  the short sp a ce  of five d e c is io n s , 
upon the id e n tic a l point, the co u rt, w hile reaching the same resu lt 
in each  c a s e ,  has ruled, in S tro h a ck e r , that the interpretation of 
the reserv atio n  must be co n tro lled  by the in ten tion  of the grantor; 
in Furqueron, that the in terp retation  of the res ervation must be 
c ontrolled by the in tention  of b o th  grantor and grantee; and, in 
S teg a ll that th e  in ten tion  of the p arties is  of no e ffe c t  but that the 
e ffec t of a reserv a tio n  of the m inerals is  governed by " le g a l and 
com m ercial u sa g e " .
Much of the confusion  in the opinions in  th e se  c a s e s  may be 
attributed to  th e  court's apparent w illin g n ess to  exp ress a wordy 
and lengthy opinion when few er words would have more appropriately 
served the sam e purpose. For exam p le, in S tro h ack er, the court 
d iscu ssed  e ig h t sep arate  and d is tin c t  grounds for d e c is io n . D evlin 
on Deeds w as c ite d  for the p roposition  that a s  a m atter of law , p et-  
roleum w as not known or reco g n ized  a s  a m ineral in 1887. But, a s  
pointed out in  B riz z o la ra , the q u estio n  p resented  is  one of fa c t  and 
not of law . Further, the ev id en ce  w as abundantly c le a r  in Stro hacker 
that the grantor, at the tim e o f execu tio n  of the con v ey an ce, had no 
intention of reserv in g  any m inerals to  i t s e lf  but intended only to  
protect i t s e l f  a g a in st c la im s under the warranty c la u s e . Why it  
should have been  n e c e ss a ry  to  rea ch  any other ground for d iscu ss io n  
cannot be g leaned  from the rep ort.
C arson  forms another in te re s tin g  c a s e  in  point .  In that c a s e ,  
great re lia n ce  w as p laced  upon Strohacker and Furqueron. But a fter  
so doing, the court seem s to  have decided that Bauxite w as not a 
mineral at a l l .  I f  th is  be s o , why w as it even  n e ce ssa ry  to  d is c u ss  
Strohacker and Furqueron w hich d eal only with m in era ls?  F u rth er , 
in C arson , th e  court subtly in je c t s  the proposition  that a ll  M isso u r i-
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P a cific  reservation s couched in the language found in that c a se  may 
be void for a new and different reason , namely that the reservation 
appears to  be as broad as the grant and hence void. If th is be so , 
the court should have squarely so  held for such decision  would 
have put to re s t any further litigation  and would have provided 
sound guide lin e s  for exam ining attorneys and inquiring landmen of 
the future.
The d e cis io n  in S teg a ll is  perhaps the most astounding of the 
entire l in e . Here for the first tim e the court adopted a form of "Rule 
in S h e lle y 's  C a se "  approach to  the construction of mineral reserv a-  
tion s; re je c te d  the contention that intention played any part in the 
construction of the reservation ; and, determined that henceforth the 
meaning of the word "m in erals" in a reservation should be governed 
by its  " le g a l and com m ercial" u sage at the time and place where 
u sed .
Nothing in  the prior decided c a se s  serves as a sound b a s is  
for the rule in  S te g a ll , and indeed S teg all appears contra to the 
preceding c a s e s . It is  true that in Stroh acker, the court mentioned 
that if  exp loration  and development operations had been general and 
legal or com m ercial usage had recognized o il and gas as m inerals, 
the reservation  would undoubtedly be good. But th is part of the 
Strohacker ru le appears to  be one of law , and not of fa c t . The 
court has y et to  favor us with the meaning of " le g a l and com m ercial 
usage" and re sea rch  has fa iled  to  develop the construction which 
other ju risd ictio n s may have p laced  upon the term .
Additional d ifficu lty  is  encountered in an endeavor to a s c e r -
tain "the tim e and p lace" where the words were u sed . Time, of 
course, is  e sta b lish ed  by the date shown on the deed. But what of 
the p lace? Thousands of a cre s  of Arkans as lands were once owned 
by railroad com panies and northern and eastern coal mining in te re s t. 
Suppose the deed of such corporate owner was executed  in S t . Louis 
and delivered in A rkansas. Is  the p lace where the word "m ineral" 
was used at the place where th e deed was execu ted  or is  the p lace  
where the deed was delivered ? Nothing in the reported c a s e s  in d i-  
ca tes  the answ er to th is problem . Suppose further that the corpo-  
rate deed be executed  in P en n sy lv an ia . Pennsylvania to  th is day 
continues to  hold that o il and g as are not m inerals.  Is the re se r -  
vation in a deed executed in P en nsylvan ia , covering Arkansas lan d s, 
to  be construed according to the Pennsylvania meaning of the term 
"m inerals" ?
A more troublesom e question  involves the p ractica l problem 
of endeavoring to determ ine, without an exam ination of in te n t, the 
time when a reservation of m inerals included o il and g a s . M ost
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examining attorneys have been exposed to a chain of title containing 
a reservation of one kind or another where grantors making conveyance 
subsequent to the original reservation simply incorporated the iden-  
tical reservation in their deeds. If intention really does not matter, 
which of the remote grantors, copying the reservation from his deed, 
shall now be held to own the oil and gas?
Laying aside criticism s, certain fundamental rules may be 
considered established concerning reservations containing the word 
"minerals" or "coal and minerals". Stated briefly, these are:
1. The use of the word mineral in a reservation made prior
to 1940 creates an ambiguity in the instrument which ambiguity 
may be resolved by evidence outside the instrument itself.
2. The construction to be given the word "mineral" is that con-  
struction which "legal and commercial usage" accorded the 
word at the time and the place where used.
3. Legal and Commercial Usage is a question of fact to be 
established by evidence and not a question of law.
4. The intention of the grantor in using the word "mineral" in a 
reservation must yield to the legal and commercial meaning 
of the word.
Assuming the correctness of these rules, how is the question 
concerning such reservations raised? In each of the cited cases, 
the remote grantee brought an action to quiet title  to the oil and 
gas. This proceeding was, of course, instituted and tried in the 
Chancery court and was subject to appeal de novo to the Supreme 
Court. This procedure undoubtedly is appropriate in most c a se s .
Since the court has subtly shifted position a number of times on 
this question, however, it may be that a desirable procedure to 
follow in cases of this type would be the commencement of an 
action for slander of title in the Circuit court, try the case to a 
jury, and leave to the Supreme Court only questions of law.
Under either approach, the type and quantity of evidence to 
be presented is  significant. Arkansas has long adhered to the rule 
that a grantor claiming against the provisions of his grant has the 
burden of proof. For this reason, the remote grantee probably has 
the burden only of introducing his deed and chain of title and this 
alone should create a prima facie case in his behalf.
On the other hand, those claiming minerals to include oil and 
gas should be prepared to prove the place where the deed was
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execu ted , th e p lace  where the deed was d elivered , the fact that 
exploration or development of o il and gas lands w as in fa ct underway 
at e ith er p lace  or that exploration and development were at le a s t  
commonly known in e ither p la c e .
As tim e p rogresses the m atter of accum ulating proof on th e se  
points becom es more and more d iffic u lt . M ost o f th ose who p rac-  
tice d  law before and around th e turn of the century are now d e c e a s e d . 
Likew ise most bankers and m erchants in b u sin e ss  at that time are 
retired or d e c e a se d . So how do you obtain the n e ce ssa ry  e v id en ce?
I had the good fortune to  be a s s o c ia te d  with Tom Harper of Fort 
Smith and B ill Wynne of El Dorado in the preparation and presentation  
in  the U . S .  D is tr ic t Court for W estern  D istric t o f A rkansas, of a 
c a s e  of th is type involving lands in  Johnson County and involving 
a deed execu ted  in 1897.
In th at c a s e ,  we presented  recorded co p ies  of o il and gas 
le a s e s  recorded about the tim e o f the reserv atio n . Such le a s e s ,  we 
subm it, show both leg a l and com m ercial u sa g e , for only an attorney 
could have prepared them , and th e re c ita l of consid eration  for the 
execution  of the le a s e  assu red ly  is  evidence of com m ercial tra ffic  
in  such l e a s e s . W e further offered  a rtic le s  of incorporation of 
vatious com panies formed to  sp e cu la te  in o il and g as; cop ies of 
an cien t new spapers with news item s relating to  the drilling and 
exploration for o il and g as; and , through some rather fortunate 
cro ss-ex a m in a tio n , showed by oral testim ony th at the law yers and 
bankers of th at day knew about o il and gas and understood its  s ig -  
n ific a n c e . B ased  on such testim o n y , Judge M iller ruled as a m atter 
of fa c t that o il and gas were known to  be m inerals in Johnson County 
in  1897. The sty le  of the c a s e  is  Mothner v . Ozark Real E state  
Company, e t a l . and Judge M ille r 's  d ecisio n  w as affirmed by the 
Eighth C ircu it Court of Appeals early  th is y ear.
Yet another form of proof might be in the nature of proof as  
to  the le g a l meaning of m in e ra ls . It seem s fa ir to  observe that the 
co u rt's  attitud e on th is  problem appears to  be influ enced  by the 
re la tiv e  la ck  of value attribu tab le  to  the m inerals a t  the time of the 
co n v ey an ce . This a ttitu d e, w hich I ch aracterize  as a w illin g n ess 
to  hold that th e  grantor intended to  part with everything not known 
to  be of s p e c ia l valu e , is  in marked contrast to  many holdings of 
our courts when dealing with th e doctrine of la c h e s .  Touching the 
la ch e s  q u estio n , the courts have recognized th at mineral values 
of l i t t le  or no s ig n ifica n ce  today may in a short tim e become worth 
m illio n s . W hy th is  recognition  is  made in one lin e  of c a s e s  and 
disregarded in  another d efies lo g ic a l exp lan atio n .
M ineral has been often defined as anything which can  be s e v -
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ercd from beneath  the surface and sold for a profit. None of the 
reported c a s e s  here discussed have defined minerals except in terms 
of the word sought to  be defined.
It is  subm itted that the parties, grantor and grantee, intended 
by use of the reserv atio n s here discussed to leave intact in the 
grantor a ll m in e ra ls , whether valuable or worthless and whether
known or unknown.
The re s u lts  reached by the Arkansas Supreme Court have brought 
about a situ a tio n  where the grantor loses that which he did not sell, 
for which he has not been paid , and with which he did not intend to 
part w hile the grantee ob tain s that for which he did not pay and which 
he did not ex cep t to  r e c e iv e .
Perhaps to  the credit of the court, it has exhibited a willingness 
to sh ift p o sitio n  on th is  question as additional litigation is presented. 
If this is  c o rre c t , it  seem s appropriate to seek a complete review of 
the law on th is  su b je c t w ith , I profoundly hope, a clarification which
deals more eq u itab ly  with a ll  p a r t ie s .
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